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Abstract 
For most developed nations the last five years have ushered in difficult economic times. 
Not though for resource rich Australia which has sustained high economic growth 
courtesy of the unquenchable thirst of China for its minerals. 
However the benefits of the mining boom have not been evenly felt, giving rise to the 
description “two speed economy”. In fact, the success of the mining industry has 
contributed to a dampening effect on some other sectors of the economy that have 
struggled in response to inflationary pressures, higher interest rates, skill shortages and 
the high Australian dollar, all a bi-product of the resources boom. Furthermore, 
peculiarities in the way that State mining royalties are calculated have not seen any 
substantial increase in Government revenues compared with soaring mining profits. 
Under the mantra “spreading the benefits of the boom” the Commonwealth Government 
stepped in to address this perceived structural flaw in the economy by proposing an 
additional tax on mining resource rents or “super profits” from 1 July 2012. In an 
extremely effective anti-tax campaign the industry was able to have the tax threat all but 
removed with the aid of the very community for whose benefit it had been conceived. In 
the process the industry succeeded in having the Prime Minister, who proposed the tax, 
dismissed by his own party and deceived the new leadership team into agreeing to a 
regime that in its first quarter of operation was not able to raise one cent of tax. 
At the same time the Government introduced an carbon tax / emissions trading scheme 
(“ETS”) putting it at the cutting edge of climate change response using fiscal measures.  
However the path to the introduction of this regime was similarly not easy. Whilst 
Australia had been active in negotiating the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, during the subsequent 
decade the Liberal coalition Government refused to embrace a price on carbon.  With 
the election of a Labor Government in 2007 the Kyoto Protocol was promptly ratified 
and an ETS proposed. However it met neither the expectations of environmentalists nor 
industry and in 2010 was shelved. Although it seemed that the impetus had been lost, 
with the toppling of a Prime Minister later that year and a Federal election resulting in 
Labor forming a coalition with the Greens, momentum again swung in favour of an ETS. 
There may be political economy lessons for the rest of the world in both how the mining 
tax was blunted and also how the ETS was designed and implemented in Australia.    
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Introduction 
On 1 July 2012 two significant new tax regimes commenced in Australia: a resource 
rents or mining tax and a carbon tax / emissions trading scheme (“ETS”). Both of these 
regimes have been highly controversial and, indeed, experimental. Policy makers 
around the globe have watched with interest both the political economy leading to their 
introduction and their design features. It can be expected that the success or otherwise 
of their operation will be monitored. 
This paper seeks to outline the political economy surrounding their introduction. The 
evidence is that the Government may have induced or even deceived into introducing a 
mining tax that will be quite ineffective. Similar concerns might be levied in relation to 
the carbon tax / ETS. In any event, the future of both taxes is not assured. 
The Mining Tax 
A fair return for the community’s assets 
On any economic measure the last decade has been a boom time for the Australian 
economy. Whilst the rest of the developed World, in particular Europe and the United 
States, has faltered under the stresses of the global financial crisis the Australian 
economy has surged on. A resources boom, driven by an insatiable thirst for raw 
materials in Asia, particularly China, ensured that the average growth rate in Australia 
remained at or above 3%. Low unemployment rates and Government surpluses are the 
envy of the World.1 
But hidden behind the macroeconomic statistics is a story of an uneven distribution of 
wealth. Whilst the mine owners have become amongst the wealthiest people in the 
World and ordinary Australians able to relocate to the remote mine sites draw 
extraordinarily high wages, those working outside the resources sector are not enjoying 
the spoils. This has given rise to the term “two-speed economy” to describe the gulf 
between that part of the economy benefitting from the mining boom and the rest.2 At the 
                                                          
1
 Jonathan Kearns and Philip Lowe, “Australia's Prosperous 2000s: Housing and the Mining Boom” 
Reserve Bank of Australia, Research Discussion Paper RDP2011-07, December 2011, available at 
http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/rdp/2011/pdf/rdp2011-07.pdf.  
2
 When taking into account regional areas and other industries suffering from the high exchange rates, 
such as the manufacturing sector, the expression “3 speed economy” might be more apt. 
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same time the Gini co-efficient, which measures the extent of the distribution of wealth 
in a country, is showing a disturbing trend away from the egalitarian society that 
Australia has traditionally claimed to be.3 
Not only has it emerged that the benefits of the boom (as the mantra has become) were 
not being equally enjoyed but, in fact, the success of the resources industry was 
actually making the environment in which other sectors of the economy were operating 
more difficult. The exit of skilled employees to the mining sites in pursuit of the huge 
wages saw a glut in the other regions resulting in construction delays and pressure on 
wages and subcontractor hourly rates. There were also complaints that the mining 
industry was not doing its share of training with the suggestion that other industries 
were subsidizing the training of staff, who, once they had their ticket, headed for the 
mines. 
Furthermore, the vast amounts of money being invested in mining infrastructure has 
had an inflationary pressure on goods and services and, most significantly, kept the 
interest rates at a higher level. This has added to the pressures on the exchange rate 
which saw the Australian dollar climb well past parity with the greenback and stay there. 
It was this later aspect that was particularly hurting other sectors, especially export 
focused industries such as tourism and manufacturing. 
The nature of Australia’s land tenure system is that most of the mineral and oil wealth is 
owned by the Crown, primarily the State Governments.4 Those States lucky enough to 
be the source of this wealth traditionally charge a royalty for its extraction. Whilst this 
creates inequalities between the States, here the Federal Government has a role to play 
in its allocation of tax revenues to ensure a relatively uniform standard of living across 
the Commonwealth. Whilst the precise basis for the calculation of the royalties due to 
the States differs these measures were determined by the Commonwealth Government 
to be inadequate in trapping for the community a fair share of the mining wealth that 
was being generated. The States professed reluctance to change their royalty models 
as they were concerned at the competitive advantage that might provide other 
jurisdictions resulting in a loss of investment and, in some cases, they had entered into 
agreements with the mining companies that made adjustments difficult. So it was that 
the Commonwealth Government pressed ahead with a proposal for an additional tax on 
the “super profits” of the mining industry.  
The diagram below illustrates how the return to the States effectively tracked as a 
relatively constant percentage of the profits from mining, up until the mid-2000s. Then 
                                                          
3
 OECD, Divided we stand. Why inequality keeps rising, 5 November 2011 available at http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/the-causes-of-growing-inequalities-in-oecd-
countries_9789264119536-en. 
4
 A good summary of how this came to be can be found at 
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_mining_law. 
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an increasing gulf began to emerge as the mining companies started generating much 
higher profits due to an increase in World resources prices that did not factor into any 
significant increase in the royalties. The concern that the Australian population was 
missing out on a fair share of this mining boom was heightened as foreign interests, 
especially Chinese companies, began to acquire greater interests in the mining 
companies with profits increasingly flowing offshore. 
 
Source: Australia’s future tax system, Commonwealth of Australia 2010, available at 
http://www.taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=html/pubs_reports.htm 
 
The response to the tax 
Immediately upon the announcement the mining industry went on the attack. 5  In 
particular it financed an advertising campaign that promoted the benefits of the mining 
industry for the ordinary Australian and how the tax threatened its well being. The 
industry focused on the emotive side, what the industry had done for the country and 
how employment would be dramatically reduced (particularly impacting on regional 
areas) if the tax was imposed. In a very effective “You’re gunna get wacked” line of 
commercials the industry’s interests were assimilated to those of the common person.6 
There were also scenes of rallies with the (billionaire) mine owners agitating the workers 
against the tax leading with the slogan “Axe the tax”.7 The tax was argued to generate 
                                                          
5
 For example see: Mathew Murphy, “Miners reject the resource super profits tax grab”, The Age (3 May 
2010) available at http://www.theage.com.au/business/miners-reject-the-resource-super-profits-tax-grab-
20100502-u1ev.html (last visited 26 December 2012). 
6
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qs7qE2FQLxw. 
7
 Paige Taylor, “Resource magnates rally to their protests against the tax”, The Australian (10 June 2010) 
available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/politics/resource-magnates-rally-to-their-protest-against-
tax/story-e6frgczf-1225877654062 (last visited 26 December 2012). 
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sovereign risk that would see mining investment flow to other countries and existing 
operations scaled back or moth balled.8 
The campaign was extraordinarily successful resulting in a plunge in the Government’s 
approval ratings.9 The poor handling of both this proposal and that of the emissions 
trading scheme 10  were attributed to Prime Minister Rudd who was subsequently 
deposed in late June 2010.11 
By 2 July 2010 his successor, Julia Gillard, had met with and negotiated significant 
compromises with three select multinational mining companies (BHP, Rio Tinto and 
Xstrata). A new Minerals Resource Rent Tax (“MRRT”) was proposed 12  and 
subsequently referred to a Policy Transition Group (“PTG”) to facilitate transition to draft 
legislation. In October 2010 an issues paper was released with details of the MRRT and 
of an extension to the PRRT.13 Following a series of consultation forums a report was 
put to the Government14 which on 24 March 2011 announced its acceptance of all the 
PTG’s recommendations. Within a year the Mineral Resources Rent Tax (MRRT) Bill 
2011 had passed both Houses of Parliament. 
Naturally this considerable watering down of the tax was accompanied with a reduction 
in forward estimates of revenue to be raised down from $12 billion over its first two 
years of operation to $10.5 billion. As these estimates factored in expected increases in 
                                                          
8
 Meanwhile the Government’s campaign focused on a professor explaining the details of the 
(complicated) tax to his students. 
9
 Phillip Coorey, “Labor faces wipeout”, Sydney Morning Herald (7 June 2010) available at 
http://www.smh.com.au/national/labor-faces-wipeout-20100606-xn7v.html (last visited 26 December  
2012).  
10
 The Carbon pollution reduction scheme: issued first as an exposure draft for public consultation on 10 
March 2009, then as a Bill on 14 May 2009 (see 
 http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:legislation/billhome/R4127) which, 
following its failure to pass the Senate, was reintroduced in 2010 but subsequently lapsed upon 
Parliament rising for the calling of a general election (see  
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:legislation/billhome/R4281). 
11
 The more remarkable given that a mere year earlier he had been one of the most popular Prime 
Minister in Australian history and had managed to cleverly navigate the economy clear of the global 
financial crisis engulfing the rest of the developed World: second in ranking with a popularity rating of 
74%: see “The Rudd Supremacy” (March 30, 2009) available at 
 http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/the-rudd-supremacy-20090330-9g6s.html (last visited 6 
November 2012). 
12
 J. Gillard, W. Swan and M. Ferguson, “Breakthrough agreement with industry on improvements to 
resources taxation”, Canberra press release, 2 July 2010 reported at 
 http://www.theage.com.au/business/gillard-cuts-mining-tax-deal-20100702-zr62.html. 
13
 Policy Transition Group,  Issues Paper: Technical design of the minerals resource rent tax transitioning 
existing petroleum projects to the petroleum resource rent tax and policies to promote exploration 
expenditure, Canberra, Australian Government, released I October 2010. 
14
 Policy Transition Group, Report to the Government: new resource taxation arrangements, Canberra, 
Australian Government, released 21 December 2010. 
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revenue due to commodity price rises of $6 billion, the actual reduction in revenues was 
$7.5 billion.15 
The reality 
Whilst the new leadership in the Government were still crowing about their success 
there was much conjecture following the issue of the amended forward estimates 
whether the watered down MRRT would actually raise the amounts foreshadowed by 
the Government. There was a suspicion fuelled by the Opposition that the Government 
had overly compromised its tax.16 
This was confirmed in early October 2012 when the first installment period for the 
payment of the tax passed without any payment being due.17 The reality then struck 
some in the Parliament that in negotiating a hastily agreed compromise with industry the 
Government may have been duped. However the Government was in an embarrassing 
position. Rather than admit to its own ineptitude it stuck to the story being spun by the 
industry that mining profits were down due to a fall in commodity prices and the high 
Australian dollar. At the same time it clung to its forecasts that the billions of dollars of 
tax revenues would begin flowing in the future.  
Subsequently in mid-December the Government was forced into an embarrassing 
admission that expected returns needed to be revised down further with the result that 
the Government’s much vaulted return to a surplus in 2013 would not occur.18 
The story of how the Commonwealth Government has seemingly been deceived by the 
mining companies is a vexed and complicated one. It needs to be told against the 
background of a dramatic toppling of a once very popular Prime Minister by his loyal 
Deputy and Treasurer. The explanation for the coup was put that the autocratic nature 
                                                          
15
 See the Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Answers to Questions on Notice, Treasury 
Portfolio, Additional Estimates 23 – 24 February 2011, Question: AET 137, Topic: Compare RSPT and 
the MRRT, Hansard Page: E 25 – E 26 available at 
 http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees (last visited 26 
December 2012). 
16
 This did not stop continued promises by the leader of the Opposition to repeal the tax if they came to 
power leading to disagreement with some in the industry who, content with what they had negotiated, 
would rather see the watered down tax remain than risk stimulating the whole debate again. In any event, 
repealing the tax might not be that straight forward, especially due to the expenditure programs 
connected to it: Debbie Guest, “Let Tony Abbott repeal mining tax, says new WA Labor leader Mark 
McGowan”, The Australian (20 January 2012) available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-
affairs/let-tony-abbott-repeal-mining-tax-says-new-wa-labor-leader-mark-mcgowan/story-fn59niix-
1226248886046 (last visited 26 December 2012). 
17
 Mining tax fails to raise any revenue in first three months”, News Limited Network (25 October 2012) 
available at http://www.news.com.au/business/companies/mining-tax-fails-to-raise-any-revenue-in-first-
three-months/story-fnda1bsz-1226502856657 (last visited 24 December 2012). 
18
 Ben Packham, “’Hugh whack’ to revenue means that budget surplus is now unlikely: Wayne Swan”, 
The Australian (20 December 2012) available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-
affairs/revenue-slide-in-2012-13-makes-labors-surplus-task-harder/story-fn59niix-1226541057969 (last 
visited 26 December 2012). 
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of the Prime Minister’s handling of the introduction of the tax had polarized the nation 
and a much more conciliatory approach was needed. Hence his assassins went into 
negotiations with the mining companies desperate to broker a compromise and, 
thereby, validate their bloody treachery. It appears that the mining companies may have 
sensed their position of strength. 
The main argument being used by the miners was that the tax would drive investment 
offshore. This always had a hollow ring to it as the complaints that Australia somehow 
represented too much sovereign risk with the imposition of this new tax had to be 
viewed in the context of the alternative sites for investment, mainly in Africa, hardly the 
bastion of the rule of law. In fact the Australian mining tax was to set a precedent that 
has since seen such taxes implemented all over the World. The nationalization of 
mining rights is now viewed as the greatest issue facing the mining industry.19 
In any event, the very notion of a Government being required to negotiate with the 
entities on which it is to impose a tax and they to have the ability to substantially change 
the Government’s position is a questionable proposition. Traditionally, dissatisfaction 
with Government decisions is voiced at the ballot box not in closed door negotiations 
whilst they are being made. The mantra of transparency and consultation on tax law 
changes had become very strong in Australia over the proceeding decade. Successive 
governments had fine tuned the consultation process in response to criticism of having 
failed to listen resulting in impractical and compliance heavy legislation. However with 
the resource rent tax it is arguable that discussions went further than consultation on 
fine tuning the legislation so that the Government’s policy could be efficiently given 
effect to, to actually negotiating with Government as to what its policy should be. 
A further concern is the limited nature of the initial closed door discussions, just three 
large mining companies. There has been considerable complaint from junior miners to 
the effect that their exclusion from these discussions resulted in a regime that 
prejudiced their interests vis-à-vis the big three. The suggestion is that the big three 
were able to negotiate a regime that gave them a competitive advantage. The juniors 
are particularly critical of the removal of the exploration rebate and the introduction of an 
election to allow the market value of pre-1 May 2010 assets to be selected as their 
starting base for deduction purposes.20 It is argued that the former measure would have 
                                                          
19
 Stan Correy, “Australia leading global charge on mining returns” ABC News (4 August 2012) available 
at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-08-04/australia-leads-global-charge-on-mining-returns/4176752 (last 
visited 24 December 2012). 
20
 The denial of a deduction for financing costs also arguably hurts the juniors more: see Elizabeth Knight, 
“Forrest quite right to fight a mine tax that bows to the big boys”, The Age (16 June 2011) available at 
http://www.smh.com.au/business/forrest-is-quite-right-to-fight-a-mine-tax-that-bows-to-the-big-boys-
20110615-1g3v1.html (last visited 24 December 2012) and Katherine French, “Small  miners cry poor as 
tax deal splits industry”,  WA Today ( 2 July 2010) available at http://www.watoday.com.au/wa-
news/small-miners-cry-poor-as-tax-deal-splits-industry-20100702-zsa7.html (last visited 24 December 
2012). 
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particularly benefitted juniors whilst the new market value election benefits the larger 
miners more due to their greater investment bases. This partly explains why one of 
these juniors is proceeding with a Constitutional challenge to the new regime (with the 
endorsement of the mining States of Queensland and West Australia) notwithstanding 
its watering down.21  
The closed door nature of the negotiations that were happening is also a concern. The 
justification was apparently that sensitive commercial information was being aired. 
Nevertheless this trend towards secrecy was maintained by the PTG in its deliberations 
on the details of the MRRT. The stakeholder consultation sessions were apparently not 
open to all stakeholders and of the 186 submissions received a mere 44 were made 
public of which few provided any considered rationale for the position they advanced.22 
The PTG was also loaded with mining industry representatives23 with even the Federal 
Minister for Resources, Energy and Tourism, who was part of the Group, having been 
accused of being too close to the industry.24 
The explanation for the substantial fall in the forward estimates is also a subject of 
contention. The industry maintains that it is due to a collapse in commodity prices and 
reflects a fall in mining profits. The Government has been reluctant to dispel this 
argument, not wishing to focus attention on the renegotiated features of its tax that may 
actually be the primary cause of the fall in revenues. Presumably these were taken into 
account in the revised 2010 Treasury figures although at least one senior Labor 
politician has publicly stated that the tax was not expected to raise any tax initially due 
to the availability of the massive deductions for capital, so bringing into question the 
veracity of the forward estimates.25  
Additionally, possibly the market valuations performed by the miners in relation to the 
carried over assets have been particularly favorable providing them with enhanced 
deductions. There is also evidence to suggest that as the new rules do not catch value 
                                                          
21
 Clancy Yeates, “High Court threat to mining tax”, Sydney Morning Herald (5 November 2012) available 
at http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/high-court-threat-to-mining-tax-20121105-28tw9.html 
 (last visited 24 December 2012). 
22
 Diane Kraal and P.W. Senarath Yapa, “Resource rent taxes: the politics of legislation” (2012) 27 
Australian Tax Forum 485 – 525. 
23
 See http://www.alp.org.au/federal-government/news/policy-transition-group-membership-and-terms-of-
re/ (last visited 26 December 2012). The former joint-chair of the PTG continues to promote mining 
company interests: Annabel Hepworth, “Mining leaders warn of exodus”, The Australian (24 November 
2012) available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/markets/mining-leaders-warn-of-
exodus/story-e6frg916-1226523110539 (last visited 26 December 2012). 
24
 Phillip Coorey, “Oakeshott outraged by minister’s legal threat”, Sydney Morning Herald (3 November 
2012) available at http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/oakeshott-outraged-by-ministers-legal-
threat-20121102-28pgz.html (last visited 26 December 2012).  
25
 See the comments ascribed to Simon Crean in “Mining tax fails to raise any revenue in first three 
months”, News Limited Network (25 October 2012) available at  
http://www.news.com.au/business/companies/mining-tax-fails-to-raise-any-revenue-in-first-three-
months/story-fnda1bsz-1226502856657 (last visited 24 December 2012). 
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added by the miners and only the value of the resource there is an opportunity to 
(re)allocate value post the taxing point.26  
However, of greatest concern to the potential revenue stream is the failure to place a 
cap on the availability of a tax credit to be offset against the MRRT for the payment of  
State based royalties. This has enabled State Governments to threaten to increase their 
royalties and gouge out the tax, resulting in promises from the Federal Treasurer to 
adjust transfer payments to the States in response. The Greens, independents and the 
Government’s own review panel have all urged for amendments to the legislation to 
impose a cap.27 The subject has seen heated debate by politicians both within and 
outside Parliament, even to the extent of claims of defamation.28 The issue needs to be 
promptly dealt with as the parallel operation of the MRRT and the royalty regimes not 
only imposes additional administrative obligations on the industry but will continue as a 
source of dispute between the two tiers of Government.29 
The Carbon Tax 
Climate change – the world on the edge 
If the scientists are correct our World is on the edge of a precipice brought about by 
climate change. Every country, indeed, humanity faces an uncertain future.30 
For Australia, already the driest inhabited continent on Earth,31 the implications of global 
warming and the extreme weather forecasts are frightening. Whilst the important 
primary production industry has an uncertain future in the face of changing weather 
                                                          
26
 David Uren, “$1.5bn MRRT tax shortfall sinks surplus hope” (5 November 2012) The Australian 
available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/treasury/bn-mrrt-tax-shortfall-sinks-surplus-
hope/story-fn59nsif-1226510236588 (last visited 24 December 2012). 
27
 Lauren Wilson and David Uren, “Remove royalty credits from mining tax: troika”, The Australian (1 
December 2012) available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/remove-royalty-credits-
from-mining-tax-troika/story-fn59niix-1226527784804 (last visited 26 December 2012). 
28
 Phillip Coorey, “Oakeshott outraged by minister’s legal threat”, Sydney Morning Herald (3 November 
2012) available at http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/oakeshott-outraged-by-ministers-legal-
threat-20121102-28pgz.html (last visited 26 December 2012). 
29
 For media reports on this issue by Phillip Coorey: “Greens, MP want mining tax toughened”, Sydney 
Morning Herald (26 October 2012) available at http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/greens-mp-
want-mining-tax-toughened-20121025-2886y.html ; “Oakeshott wants Treasury brief on mining tax”, 
Sydney Morning Herald (8 November 2012) available at http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-
news/oakeshott-wants-treasury-brief-on-mining-tax-20121107-28yi3.html;  “Unsustainable mining tax 
must be fixed – Oakeshott” (21 November 2012), Sydney Morning Herald available at 
http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/unsustainable-mining-tax-must-be-fixed--oakeshott-
20121120-29o2e.html and (with Mathew Dunckley) “Stand-off with states over mining royalties”, The 
Australian Financial Review (18 December 2012) available at 
 http://www.afr.com/p/national/stand_off_with_states_over_mining_h2cyCYhG2QcOgZmrwNDu0M (all 
last visited 24 December 2012). 
30
 It is not proposed to canvass the scientific debate in this paper. This has been performed admirably by 
others. For example, see Lidia Xynas, “Climate change mitigation: carbon tax – is it the better answer for 
Australia?” Australian Tax Forum 26 (2011): 339 – 347. 
31
 See http://www.about-australia.com/facts/ (last visited 11 November 2012). 
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patterns,32 with 85% of the population coastal dwellers,33 rising sea levels will directly 
affect much of the population. The anticipated destruction of Great Barrier Reef before 
the end of the century and erosion of the country’s World renowned beaches will impact 
harshly on tourism and the cherished quality of life of the Australian population. Apart 
from those island nations that will simply cease to exist34 few countries may be as 
adversely impacted by climate change as Australia. 
It could, therefore, be anticipated that Australia would be at the forefront of efforts to 
reduce manmade emissions of carbon considered by most scientists to be cause of the 
problem that is climate change. However, huge distances between population centres, 
necessitating long distant transport, together with sprawling cities, have conspired to 
render Australia the greatest emitter of carbon per head of population in the developed 
World.35 Furthermore, its vast reserves of coal, and the vital extractive industry that 
these reserves support, provide no incentive to see the use of coal reduced, albeit that 
coal powered electrical generation is one of the World’s primary sources of manmade 
carbon emissions.36 
So the country has faced a conundrum. The quality of life of its inhabitants demands 
that climate change be tackled. Yet any measures focused on the reduction of carbon 
emissions will require both fundamental changes to the economy and to the entrenched 
behavior of the population. Furthermore, as a relatively small country in terms of 
population the impact of any carbon emission reductions in the global context might be 
almost negligible37 yet as a price taker in global markets its industry needs to remain 
competitive. 
Apart from (initial) contention over the science and reality of human induced climate 
change it is these considerations that have been at the heart of the debate in Australia 
as to the appropriate response to global warming. 
 
                                                          
32
 B. L. Preston and R. N. Jones, Climate change impacts on Australia and the benefits of early action to 
reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, CSIRO February 2006 available at 
http://www.csiro.au/files/files/p6fy.pdf (last visited 11 November 2012). 
33
 The Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year book of Australia 2004 available 
at 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/1301.0Feature%20Article32004?opendocum
ent&tabname=Summary&prodno=1301.0&issue=2004&num=&view= (last visited 11 November 2012). 
34
 For example, see Bill Blakemore, “Micronesia: A third kind of Nation, Written off?”, ABC News, 9 
December 2009 available at http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/global-warming-micronesia-island-
nations-threatened-sea-level/story?id=9280340 (last visited 11 November 2012). 
35
 Climate Commission, The critical decade: international action on climate change, Commonwealth of 
Australia 2012 available at www.climatecommission.gov.au  (last visited 5 October 2012) 13 - 19. 
36
 Coal amounts for around 75% of Australia’s electricity generations: Climate Commission, The critical 
decade, 15. 
37
 Although, according to the Climate Commission, Australia is the 15
th
 largest emitter (larger than around 
180 other countries): Climate Commission, The critical decade, 14. 
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Australia’s path to a price on carbon 
International agreement on climate change dates back to the early 1990s. In Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil in 1992, 166 countries signed the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) agreeing to work towards stabilizing greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere.38 This Convention set no mandatory limits but in 
December 1997 the parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol, under which developed 
countries collectively committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 5% 
below 1990 levels during 2008 to 2012.  
Working alongside the Kyoto Protocol have been the United Nations climate change 
conferences. Since the 2010 session at Cancun (Mexico) though, countries have begun 
pledging to limit or reduce their emissions. These countries include Australia which has 
pledged to reduce its emissions by 5% compared with 2000 levels by 2020.39 Whilst it is 
difficult to compare the various pledges, Australia’s Climate Commission has suggested 
that Australia’s commitment is broadly comparable to other countries, in particular the 
targets of the United States, Japan, Europe and China.40 
2007 is year zero for climate change response in Australia. As at the start of the year 
the Liberal coalition Government had been in power for just over 10 years during which 
time it had refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol or establish a comprehensive 
greenhouse gas reduction strategy. Finally, following the final report of the Prime 
Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading, all but the diehards in the Government 
accepted the science of climate change and the Government committed the country to a 
carbon trading scheme.41 The Labor Opposition had also commissioned the Garnaut 
Climate Change Review earlier in the year.42 The result was that both major parties 
went to the November 2007 election with a promise to introduce carbon trading.  
The subsequent election of a Labor Government was viewed as a mandate from the 
people to deal with climate change, which the new Prime Minister had said was the 
“greatest moral challenge” facing the country on which he was committed to act. Indeed 
one of the Government’s first acts was to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. In the euphoria of 
the moment the introduction of a carbon price in Australia seemed assured. 
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There followed during 2008 a number of reports and Government papers teasing out 
the details of how an ETS might be implemented and seeking community input.43 This 
fostered considerable public debate and political lobbying which extended throughout 
2009. The Government faced the difficulty that, although it had a large majority in the 
lower house, the peculiarities of the Australian federal electoral system were that 
conservatives continued to control the Senate. Thus it was necessary for it to negotiate 
to ensure passage of its legislation. Against this political reality the Government 
introduced a Bill into Parliament on May 14, 2009 to enact an emissions trading scheme 
termed the “carbon pollution reduction scheme” (“CPRS”).44  
However as a negotiated compromise the scheme failed to meet the expectations of 
environmentalists nor be acceptable to industry. There were too many exclusions, free 
permits and a particular problematic feature allowing for the acquisition of cheap permits 
from the developing World as a substitution for emission cuts. Furthermore, 
uncertainties remained and the complexity of the regime made it difficult to sell to the 
community. A foreshadowed low fixed permit price of $10 AUD per tonne in the first 
year of operation raised the spectra that the scheme would create a mere revenue 
churn that would not be effective in achieving its environmental objectives.  
Nevertheless, successful negotiations with the leader of the Liberal coalition in 
November 2009 seemed to ensure the safe passage of the Bill. However the inability of 
the Opposition leader to bring the remaining climate change skeptics within his party 
onboard saw him imprudently issue an ultimatum leading to his ousting as leader.45 His 
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replacement, a climate change skeptic himself, led the Senate to reject the Bill for a 
second time.46  
Whilst the Bill was reintroduced into Parliament in 2010, public weariness of the issue 
together with an increasing reluctance to embark on any initiative whose impact on the 
economy was potentially negative at a time of continuing global economic instability, 
induced the Prime Minister to announce that resolution of the country’s greatest moral 
challenge would be deferred until such time as greater World consensus was reached.47 
His subsequent inability to achieve passage of the equally controversial mining tax was 
to see him replaced as leader in June 2010. Reading the community’s fatigue with the 
issue his successor, Prime Minister Gillard, went to the August election under a no 
carbon tax platform. 48  With the Opposition leader publicly doubting the science of 
climate change both major Australian political parties had dramatically retreated from a 
policy to impose a price on carbon in three short years. A highly popular Prime Minister 
and well regarded leader of the Liberal coalition Opposition had been dethroned in the 
process. 
Nevertheless, a massive swing against the Government was to see it only retain office 
with the help of independents and the Greens as part of a power sharing agreement. 
This was a game changer. Carbon pricing was back on the agenda.  
The 2012 Australian ETS 
In fulfillment of the Labor Government’s power sharing agreement with the Greens a 
Multi-party Climate Change Committee was established to determine the exact way this 
would be delivered. Fundamental design issues had to be negotiated in a highly 
charged atmosphere. Business and right wing lobby groups were fuelling the Opposition 
attacks.49 Pledges in blood that the regime would be repealed when they were returned 
to office,50 calls for a national plebiscite on its introduction51 and attempts to arrest 
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power from the Government in the lower house52 were all part of the attack. On the 
other side, environmental lobby groups were demanding a price that internalized the full 
cost of carbon pollution and an end to contradictory policies (such as assistance to 
polluting industries).53 Even actors54 and State politicians55 entered into the fray. 
The Government’s primary mechanism for galvanizing community support and 
introducing credible evidence to support its policy was to establish, as part of the 
Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, a Climate Commission 
empowered to lead the national debate on the implications of climate change and the 
appropriate response. As at August 2012 the Commission had been very active, having 
issued 12 reports, primarily focusing on the need for strong rapid action and the steps 
Australia could take.  
In February 2011 the Prime Minister announced the broad features of a resurrected 
ETS based on the recommendations of the Multi-party committee. 56  However the 
precise details remained fluid with further refinement present in the draft legislative 
package issued for comment in July 2011 and the subsequent bills presented to 
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Parliament in September 2011,57 with even further changes made leading up to the 1 
July 2012 commencement of the scheme.58 
The politics of implementation: price setting, exclusions and compensation  
The regime is the product of a political bargain. How some of the fundamental aspects 
of the regime were arrived can be explained as follows. 
Carbon tax or emissions trading scheme 
There is a debate as to the most appropriate mechanism for pricing carbon. Essentially 
there are two choices: a tax on carbon emissions or a market mechanism whereby a 
cap is placed on the amount of carbon that the country should emit and permits to emit 
carbon are issued and traded. Under such a “cap and trade” system permits might be 
both issued by the Government and, effectively, created by entities trapping carbon.59 
The Australian regime is a hybrid. This reflects a view that the country needs to be part 
of a global market for carbon permits that the Government hopes will exist by 2015. 
Until then the regime operates as a carbon tax which avoids the potential for price 
volatility in the carbon price. This has plagued the European Union ETS with the carbon 
price at one time falling dramatically when the market reacted to a view that there had 
been an oversupply of free permits. Price volatility was also especially a risk in the short 
term while the scheme remained the subject of controversy and threats to repeal it. 
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Ensuring a minimum ceiling for the carbon price both has the effect of maintaining the 
impetus for behavioral change, especially by providing assurance to those 
contemplating low carbon investments, and protecting government revenues.  
The carbon price 
The hybrid nature of the regime required the Government to set the initial price. This 
exercise involved a tradeoff between the environment and the economy. It was 
inevitable that proponents of the two sides would be unsatisfied with the outcome. 
Business interests pointed to the price at which carbon permits were trading in Europe 
(around $15 AUD) whilst environmentalists pointed to analysis that suggested a price 
around $130 AUD was necessary to drive a move to renewable energy sources. 
Ultimately the price of $23 AUD accepts a need for carbon to be priced but at a level 
that the Government hopes will not damage the economy and lead to massive carbon 
leakage. 
Large emitter threshold 
The regime applies to “large” emitters, namely entities that emit 25,000 metric tonnes60 
of carbon dioxide annually (or the equivalent) 61  with entities required to calculate 
emissions and be subject to audit. The Government has stated that this should account 
for around 60% of Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions. The logic behind the threshold 
is to not burden smaller emitters with the cost and administration imposed by the 
regime, although those close to the threshold will still need to be able to verify that their 
emissions level does not exceed it. Notably the Clean Energy Regulator downgraded 
the list of affected entities from a projection of more than 500 (initially 1,000) to only 294 
just prior to the regime taking effect.62  
Exemption for the agricultural sector 
The agricultural sector was exempted albeit that it is the country’s third largest emitter. 
Various justifications for this have been given including the difficulty of measuring 
emissions on farms,63 the fact that the industry is a price taker and could not pass on 
the added costs64 and that the concession was necessary to obtain the support of the 
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independents on whom the Government relies.65 Gasoline was also exempted but large 
diesel and jet fuel users are to be subject to increases in excise taxes. 66 
Emissions intensive trade exposed (“EITE”) industries 
EITE industries are those on whom the imposition of a carbon price is particularly likely 
to damage their international competitiveness, such as steel, aluminum, zinc and glass 
production. Such industries might well respond by relocating to a jurisdiction that does 
not impose a price on carbon. This phenomenon is termed “carbon leakage”. To 
mitigate this possibility such industries are to receive substantial assistance in the form 
of free units covering up to 94.5% of their liability during the first three years, although 
this assistance will taper off at 1.3% per annum reflecting a carbon productivity 
contribution. The steel industry is to receive added assistance to encourage innovation 
and efficiency whilst the natural gas industry is also to receive a special 50% assistance 
level. The coal sector is to receive special assistance to help the transition away from 
the most emissions intensive coal mines whilst an energy security fund is to be 
established to provide some assistance to the electricity generation sector. These 
aspects of the regime all reflect the Government’s concern not to damage the economy 
with a too greater initial shock but rather to allow high emitting industries critical to the 
economic health of the nation time to introduce measures to reduce their exposure.  
On the other side of the equation the Government is also supporting the nascent clean 
energy industry. The most significant proposal is the establishment of the Clean Energy 
Finance Corporation to be set up to increase investment in renewable energy, energy 
efficiency and other low emissions technology. The Government has been active to 
promote the opportunities that the introduction of the scheme has for those wishing to 
be part of the vanguard of a new clean energy industry. 
The level of assistance to EITE industries is particularly controversial and problematic. 
Whilst the rationale is to encourage the continuation of domestic production and prevent 
carbon leakage it has been argued that the assistance is excessive leading to windfall 
gains to these industries, the damaging of the environmental effectiveness of the regime 
by reducing incentives and increasing the cost of carbon reduction elsewhere in the 
economy.67 This is not to say that properly designed assistance to EITE industries may 
not be appropriate and necessary. The alternative of a border adjustment tax on imports 
from non-carbon pricing jurisdictions suffers from legal uncertainty in terms of 
compliance with GATT principles, administrative costs and calculation difficulties and 
could lead to international trade disputes and protectionism. Until international 
agreement and acceptance of such a mechanism is achieved the approach adopted in 
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Australia of a free allocation of units is likely to be the preferred approach to counter 
carbon leakage.68 
Compensation and managing price rises 
Whilst it was acknowledged, and indeed is the rationale for the scheme, that the price of 
certain products in the market place would rise, the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (“ACCC”) is to take action against any price gouging claimed 
falsely to be as a result of the introduction of the regime. Certainly it was anticipated that 
the price of electricity would rise but businesses intending on passing on additional 
costs to consumers are required to be able to substantiate that this is a result of the 
carbon measures if this is, in fact, what they claim. Given the potential for the electricity 
price rises to challenge the community’s resolve to put a price on carbon 69  the 
Government initiated a marketing offensive to defray concerns as to the significance of 
the carbon price on electricity prices:70 see figure 1. 
Although there is contention over whether the initial set price of $23 AUD a tonne is too 
low (to encourage a change in behavior or investment in clean energy) or too high 
(compared to other regimes and hence damaging the international competitiveness of 
Australian businesses) forecasts suggest that it will flow through as a 5 – 10% increase 
in the price of electricity and gas, 0.5 – 2% increase in the price of steel, aluminum and 
cement and 0 – 0.5% increase in the cost of waste removal services, water, fuel, 
chemicals and paper.71 These price rises are promoted by the Government as modest 
and more than offset by the increased compensation to some businesses and 
households. Whilst the Opposition suggests that the ETS and its counter veiling 
compensation measures will simply generate a pointless money churn the Government 
argues that cashed up households will spend their extra funds wisely focusing on those 
industries and products that are able to avoid price rises through clean energy 
investment and/or energy savings. Market forces will, therefore, accelerate the desired 
change in behavior. 
Although the Opposition mounted a scare program in the lead up to 1 July 2012,72 price 
monitoring in the months following identified little impact from the ETS.73 Admittedly 
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these were early days and it might be expected that any flow on effect will take some 
time to work its way through to retail prices. There were, however, a number of grievous 
and well publicized attempts to profit gouge blaming the ETS identified by the ACCC.74 
There were also businesses that were rumored to have sacked workers, closed down or 
moved offshore in response partly, at least, to the introduction of the measures with 
small business reportedly particularly affected due to their apparent inability to be able 
to pass on the additional costs arising from the carbon price.75 
Presumably the Government hopes that the package as a whole sufficiently sugar coats 
the introduction of a carbon price so that both the economy (and the Government) can 
survive the experience. At the same time the measures must not be that unobtrusive 
that they do not bring about the desired behavioral change. Only time will tell although 
on 18 October the Government announced that carbon emissions from electricity 
generation had fallen since the introduction of the measures, although at the same time 
arguing that the carbon price had only marginally contributed to a rise in electricity 
prices.76 The Government is, it seems, having it both ways. 
Is there really an Australian carbon pricing spring and, if so, will it prevail? 
The lingering effects of the global economic crisis stymied the nascent attempts by 
some World leaders to rise above the disappointments of the Copenhagen, Cancun and 
Durban climate change conferences and actually implement a fiscal response to climate 
change. Australia has been a star exception, albeit that the country only contributes 
1.5% of the global greenhouse gas emissions.77 This raises the question as to why has 
the country proceeded down a path so many other countries have shied away from?  
The answer is one of political necessity. Notwithstanding the Prime Minister’s non-
carbon tax pledge, decimation at the 2010 polls saw the Government only retain power 
with the aid of the Greens on whose insistence the implementation of a carbon price 
became Government policy. Furthermore, it could be suggested that the regime is mere 
window dressing - an attempt to look as if the Government is doing something. Given 
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Treasury estimates that a price around $131 AUD per tonne is necessary to meet the 
Government’s greenhouse gas reduction targets,78 something politically inconceivable, 
it is difficult to see how a price of $23 AUD per tonne will generate sufficient financial 
imperative to steer the economy towards a renewable energy future. If there is likely to 
be one real effect of the Government’s climate change reforms it may be to lock the 
economy into an alternative fossil fuel, namely gas-fired power rather than the more 
polluting coal-fired power.79 
The likelihood of the failure of the pricing to be able to achieve the outcome pleaded for 
by the scientists may be exacerbated by other design features.80 Notable of these are 
the limited application of the tax to 294 big polluters (1,000 was the initial plan),81 the 
exclusions for some industries and sectors (notably agriculture), the free units for trade 
exposed high polluting entities (shielding them from up to 94.5% of their liability) and the 
massive household compensation scheme that will see nine out of ten households 
receiving some compensation, many in excess of the anticipated impact on them.82 The 
combined effect of these features is that the regime will not be revenue neutral for the 
Government, at least initially. Whilst the rationale of the compensation is to soften its 
introduction, the Government must surely be looking towards the long term. For carbon 
pricing to generate the necessary behavioral changes the compensation package must 
eventually disappear into the inflation generated bracket creep and government policy 
change morass.83 
In any event, whether the Government’s carbon pricing mechanism (for what it is) has a 
long term future is uncertain. Whilst the weight of the science has apparently convinced 
most in the Opposition that climate change is real and manmade, the centre piece of 
their climate change policy is direct measures at tackling carbon emissions with a 
promise to repeal the ETS.  This threat to repeal the regime is significant given that the 
Opposition is expected to win the elections scheduled for late 2013.84 Even the mere 
threat is damaging enough to the policy aims of the regime. The Opposition has warned 
businesses not to purchase forward units in a scheme that will be closed down. Any 
investment decisions away from fossil fuels towards renewable energy need long term 
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certainty and investment groups have slammed this approach of the Opposition as 
irresponsible and introducing political risk into the investment equation.85 
Of course, whether the Opposition will be elected (and have control of both houses of 
Parliament) cannot be taken for granted, even given their current lead in the polls.86 The 
current Opposition leader is as unpopular as the Prime Minister and liable to damaging 
gaffs.87 Furthermore, whilst he has made a “pledge in blood” that he will repeal the 
regime88 the international implications of such a move now that an agreement for mutual 
recognition of European units has been forged, the fact that domestic businesses may 
have, in fact, bought units in advance and the need to also unwind the massive 
compensation arrangements directed towards business and households, would make 
this a challenging proposition.  
Conclusion 
The saga of the mining tax in Australia is a lesson in how vested interests can hijack 
Government policy and even turn the very people that the policy is designed to benefit 
against it. It is a story not just about the power of advertising and the media, political 
opportunism, the excessive influence of lobbyists and the rise in dominance of multi-
national corporations over the nation state. But, it is also a story about lost 
opportunities, the squandering of a nation’s assets and a betrayal of future generations. 
Time will tell if the mining tax can be re-invented into something more effective89 or will 
even survive in its current state. 90  Its greatest ally may be its weakness. As the 
community learns of the extent of the miner’s victory perhaps the pendulum may swing 
in favour of strengthening the tax. 
Whilst the Government continues to revise down its budget forecasts and ponder as to 
where it went wrong it may reflect on the need for strong leadership in dealing with 
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vested interests. Consultation on implementation is one thing but negotiation on 
considered Government policy should only be only permitted at the margins. A healthy 
skepticism to claims of impending doom should be entertained. 
Perhaps the one positive legacy from the Australian fiasco is the precedent that has 
encouraged other countries, especially those in Africa, to seek a greater return for the 
nation from the exploitation of their non-renewable resources. Maybe the global race to 
the bottom in relation to mining taxation, a description that has typically been ascribed 
to the competition to lower taxes on multi-national companies or risk their relocation, 
might slow or even reverse. 
The Australian carbon pricing mechanism is the product of ten years of heated political 
debate. It played a part in the demise of the country’s second longest serving 
conservative Prime Minister who took too long to accept the science. It saw the end of a 
conservative Opposition leader who fell on his sword trying to drag the skeptics in his 
party to an enlightened future. It hastened the end of one of the most popular Prime 
Ministers in Australian history91 who, after campaigning on a climate change response 
being the greatest moral challenge facing the country, failed in his attempts to pass the 
legislation. It witnessed his successor campaign on the promise that no carbon tax 
would be introduced then, within six months, announce that the Government would 
proceed to introduce an ETS. Even now, with the regime operating, it remains 
controversial and its future uncertain.92 Furthermore, there is a concern that the political 
concessions necessary to achieve its introduction may have watered the regime down 
to such an extent that it will be ineffective to achieve its environmental objectives. 
Whilst political economy theory predicts that broad ranging ETSs are almost impossible 
to introduce as the most influential political actors oppose carbon markets, the 
Australian experience bears out that under certain circumstances policy windows for the 
introduction of such systems may open.93 However this opening may well have been the 
result of serendipity that could be short-lived.  
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